Enactivism: Progressive, Pluralist—or Just Halfway Empiricism?

Enactivism, a theory of cognition, struggles to meet standard philosophy-of-science criteria such as Popperian falsifiability or Kuhnian paradigm shifts, but aligns better with Lakatos's model, which protects a hardcore of principles by fiat. However, enactivism fails Lakatos's requirement for testing that generates anomalies and yields novel predictions, sometimes ignoring anomalies or engaging in what William James calls halfway empiricism—maintaining positions despite evidence. James anticipates Feyerabend's pluralism and his claim that scientific ideals rarely match actual practices. From this perspective, enactivism might count as a science, but only with diluted epistemic authority. James and Feyerabend suggest that logical consistency matters in simple cases, but it is not obvious that the complexities of mind are explicable by a single, internally consistent theory.

Study at a glance

Abstract

Despite historical shifts, “science” has consistently meant epistemic authority, perhaps leading enactivists to cast their work accordingly. Yet enactivism sits uneasily with Popperian falsifiability, Kuhnian paradigm shifts, Hempel’s standards, and other philosophy of science benchmarks, but does better under Lakatos. Lakatos’s model holds that progressive science preserves a hardcore of principles by fiat, aligning with enactivism’s reliance on non-negotiable grounding tenets. However, Lakatos also requires testing that generates anomalies and yields novel predictions, exemplified by the postulation and discovery of a new planet to protect Newtonian mechanics. Enactivism struggles on this second step, sometimes ignoring anomalies, as with representational additions to Brooks’s robotics, or else engaging in what William James calls halfway empiricism—which definitionally pre-empts alternatives to maintain positions despite, rather than because of, evidence. James anticipates Feyerabend’s pluralism and his claim that scientific ideals—unified method, neutral observation, cumulative progress, and empirical fit—rarely match practices. From this angle, enactivism might count as a science, albeit only with diluted epistemic authority. James and Feyerabend offer an additional lesson: logical consistency matters in simple cases like rejecting “square circles,” but it is not obvious that the complexities of mind are explicable by a single, internally consistent theory.