The structure of intentionality: insights and challenges for enactivism
Inquiry May 26, 2023 DOI: 10.1080/0020174x.2023.2216753 via Semantic Scholar
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractEnactivism, a view that cognition arises from dynamic interaction with the environment, faces a tension about whether intentionality—the directedness of mental states—involves content after rejecting representationalism. The paper clarifies how enactivists sometimes say intentionality is contentful and sometimes not, and compares this tension to two classic accounts: Husserl's theory of intentionality in the Logical Investigations and Peirce's triadic semiotics. The analysis shows how these historical frameworks illuminate the unresolved issues in enactivist philosophy.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Philosophy |
| Citations | 5 |
| Key finding | Enactivism's rejection of representationalism creates an unresolved tension about whether intentionality is contentful, which can be clarified by comparing it to Husserl's and Peirce's theories. |
Abstract
ABSTRACT The purpose of the paper is twofold. It first aims at clarifying and developing an important tension within enactivism concerning the relations between intentionality and content, once representationalism has been abandoned. In which sense(s) do enactivists (still) say that intentionality is contentful and not contentful? Secondly, it puts this tension in perspective with two paradigmatic ways of defining the relations between intentional states and their objects: Husserl’s theory of intentionality in the Logical Investigations, and Charles Sanders Peirce’s triadic semiotics.