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Why Brains Are Not Computers, Why Behaviorism Is Not Satanism, and Why Dolphins Are Not Aquatic Apes.

Louise Barrett

The Behavior analyst May 1, 2016 DOI: 10.1007/s40614-015-0047-0 via PubMed

Summary

AI-generated from the abstract

Mainstream psychology treats the brain like a computer that processes sensory input and produces motor output, separating it from the body and environment. This view overlooks the deep connections between organisms and their surroundings, leading to a misunderstanding of both human and nonhuman cognition. The author argues for an embodied, enactive, and mutualistic perspective that asks better questions about how animals know their worlds, avoiding the anthropocentric biases of the cognitivist approach.

Study at a glance

Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Keywords 4e cognition Anthropocentrism Behavior Comparative psychology
Citations 67
Key finding A mutualistic, embodied, enactive view of cognition avoids anthropocentric biases and better captures how animals know their worlds.

Abstract

Modern psychology has, to all intents and purposes, become synonymous with cognitive psychology, with an emphasis on the idea that the brain is a form of computer, whose job is to take in sensory input, process information, and produce motor output. This places the brain at a remove from both the body and environment and denies the intimate connection that exists between them. As a result, a great injustice is done to both human and nonhuman animals: On the one hand, we fail to recognize the distinctive nature of nonhuman cognition, and on the other hand, we continue to promote a somewhat misleading view of human psychological capacities. Here, I suggest a more mutualistic, embodied, enactive view might allow us to ask more interesting questions about how animals of all kinds come to know their worlds, in ways that avoid the (inevitable) anthropocentric baggage of the cognitivist viewpoint.

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