False-Belief Understanding, 4E Cognition, and Predictive Processing

The chapter examines empirical findings on false-belief understanding, which have been central to debates about social cognition. Proponents of 4E cognition (embodied, embedded, extended, enactive) challenge the traditional mindreading view that social cognition primarily involves inferring others' mental states to predict behavior. The author critiques both the philosophical interpretation and experimental designs of false-belief studies from a 4E perspective, then proposes an alternative interpretation inspired by predictive processing. This alternative is assessed for compatibility with core 4E insights, suggesting that social cognition may be more about dynamic interaction than mental state attribution.

Study at a glance

Abstract

Abstract Mindreading accounts of social cognition have been increasingly challenged over the past couple of decades. Proponents of 4E cognition have argued that social cognition is not (primarily) about reading another agent’s mental states in order to predict or explain his or her behavior. A large part of their criticism has focused on the empirical findings on false-belief understanding, questioning both the philosophical interpretation of these findings and the experimental designs that give rise to them. In this chapter I will (1) discuss the empirical findings on false-belief understanding in light of the criticism leveled by proponents of 4E cognition, and (2) propose an alternative interpretation of these findings, one that is inspired by the predictive processing paradigm, and investigate to what extent this interpretation is compatible with the main insights of 4E cognition.