Enactivism and Normativity The Case of Aesthetic Gestures

Enactivist theories hold that cognition emerges from the dynamic interaction between an organism and its environment. A key challenge is explaining normativity—how standards of correctness arise—without reducing it to mere biology. This article reviews several proposed solutions, such as agent-environment dynamics and participatory sense-making, and argues that gestures of appreciation or disapproval in aesthetic contexts provide clear examples of enacted normativity. The author suggests that ideas from Wittgenstein and Dewey can be fruitfully developed within an enactive framework to address this challenge.

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Abstract

Enactivist approaches claim that cognition arises through a dynamic interaction between an acting organism and its environment. An ongoing challenge for these approaches is the problem of accounting for normativity while avoiding overly reductionist outcomes. This article examines a few proposed solutions, including agent-environment dynamics, participatory sense-making, radical enactivism, the skilful intentionality framework, and enactivist cultural psychology. It argues that good examples of enacted normativity are gestures of appreciation/disapproval performed in the aesthetic domain. Both Wittgenstein and Dewey explore this issue and their ideas could be productively worked upon in an enactive account.