Direct Social Perception

Direct social perception (DSP) holds that people can directly perceive others' mental states—emotions, desires, intentions—through their expressive, goal-directed behavior, challenging the idea that mental states are hidden inside the head. This chapter traces DSP's roots in phenomenologists like Husserl, Scheler, and Merleau-Ponty, and draws on 4E cognition and empirical work suggesting that embodied expressions (facial expressions, gestures) may partly constitute emotions themselves. The author defends DSP against objections, arguing that social cognition does not require inference or simulation to access others' minds.

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Abstract

Abstract Defenders of a view called “direct social perception” (DSP) argue that our social-cognitive capacities rest on our ability to directly perceive others’ mental states—their emotions, desires, intentions, etc.—embodied in their expressive, goal-directed behavior. DSP thus challenges the widespread assumption that mental states are intracranial phenomena, perceptually inaccessible to everyone but their owner. In this chapter, I consider a version of DSP that draws upon phenomenology, 4E cognition, and empirical work in cognitive science. I first examine DSP in its historical context, focusing on its development in the hands of phenomenologists like Husserl, Scheler, and Merleau-Ponty. I then consider some supporting arguments and empirical evidence—particularly work suggesting that embodied expressions of emotions (e.g., facial expressions, gestures, etc.) may constitute part of the emotion itself. I conclude by defending DSP against several objections.