The Extended Body Hypothesis

The chapter examines whether bodily awareness, like cognition, can extend beyond the biological body. It considers a weak version of the extended body hypothesis, where tool embodiment shows that the sense of body is malleable but limited—people do not genuinely feel sensations in tools. A stronger version claims bodily awareness is not even bounded by the apparent body, as sensations can be experienced in peripersonal space. However, the author argues that even in such cases, the apparent boundaries of skull and skin remain significant, suggesting that bodily awareness has constraints that cognition may not share.

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Abstract

Abstract According to the extended mind hypothesis, “There is nothing sacred about skull and skin” for our cognitive abilities (Clark and Chalmers 1998). Is this also true for bodily awareness? In this chapter I consider several versions of what we can call the extended body hypothesis. According to a weak version, bodily awareness is not limited by the biological boundaries of our body. In light of tool embodiment, I highlight the malleability of embodiment but also show that there are important limitations to the sensations that we can feel in tools. I then consider a stronger version of the extended body hypothesis, according to which bodily awareness is not even constrained by the apparent boundaries of the body. I will describe how we can experience sensations in peripersonal space, but argue that even then there seems to be something sacred about our apparent skull and skin.