Joint Action and 4E Cognition

Interest in joint action—activities where two or more people coordinate to achieve a common goal—has grown across psychology, sociology, cognitive science, and philosophy. This chapter reviews recent philosophical and empirical work, highlighting embedded, embodied, extended, and enactive perspectives that challenge traditional accounts. The authors argue for an ecumenical approach, integrating high-level and low-level explanations from multiple disciplines. They conclude that no single theory can fully capture joint action's complexity; instead, researchers should seek a tapestry of complementary explanatory tools.

Study at a glance

Abstract

Over past thirty years there has been an increased interest in studying joint action across a number of different disciplines including psychology, sociology, cognitive anthropology, cognitive science, and philosophy. In this chapter we canvas recent philosophical and empirical research on joint action. Along the way we highlight embedded, embodied, extended, and enactive approaches and the challenges they pose for more orthodox approaches to joint action. We propose an ecumenical approach to the study of joint action. The cognitive science of joint action will have to integrate both high-level and low-level approaches across a variety of disciplines, including experimental psychology, neuroscience, and philosophy. A single unitary account is unlikely to capture the nuanced and complex nature of joint action. Instead, we argue that we should seek a better understanding of how various accounts coalesce into a tapestry of explanatory tools.