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When Metaphor Becomes Flesh: Reconceptualizing Synaesthetic Metaphors in Becoming Animal

Agata Walek

Annales Universitatis Mariae Curie-Skłodowska sectio FF – Philologiae December 29, 2025 DOI: 10.17951/ff.2025.43.2.189-201 via OpenAlex

Summary

AI-generated from the abstract

David Abram's book Becoming Animal uses metaphorical language to reveal and enact the embodied character of human experience. The physical dimension of metaphor invites readers to sense the protagonist's carnality resonating within their own body, fostering a reciprocal exchange with the world through synaesthetic metaphors. The article argues that embodiment enables a natural union of the senses, challenging the Aristotelian model of five distinct senses and questioning the status of so-called synaesthetic metaphors—grounded in lived experience, they may no longer be strictly “synaesthetic” or merely “metaphorical.” The analysis uses conceptual metaphor theory and phenomenological insights from Maurice Merleau-Ponty.

Study at a glance

Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Keywords Embodied cognition Conceptual metaphor Reciprocal Character mathematics Natural archaeology
Key finding Embodiment enables a natural union of the senses, challenging the Aristotelian model of five distinct senses and questioning the status of synaesthetic metaphors as either strictly synaesthetic or merely metaphorical.

Abstract

This paper explores David Abram’s non-fiction work Becoming Animal, highlighting, how his extensive use of metaphorical language reveals and enacts the embodied character of human experience. The physical dimension of metaphor invites the reader to sense the protagonist’s carnality as resonating within their own body, and through this heightened bodily awareness, to experience a reciprocal exchange with the world – a process frequently conveyed in the text through synaesthetic metaphors. This article argues that our very embodiment enables a natural union of the senses, thereby challenging the Aristotelian model of five distinct senses and calling into question the status of so-called synaesthetic metaphors – since, grounded in lived experience, they may no longer be either strictly “synaesthetic” or merely “metaphorical.” The paper employs conceptual metaphor theory as its primary framework, complemented by phenomenological insights from Maurice Merleau-Ponty.

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