Affectivity in mental disorders: an enactive-simondonian approach
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences September 8, 2023 DOI: 10.1007/s11097-023-09929-8 via OpenAlex
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractAffectivity is central to mental disorders because sense-making is inherently affective. Drawing on Husserl's genetic method and Simondonian philosophy, sense-making is described as the progressive concretization of self-world structures that support conscious intentionality. Affectivity anticipates partial self-world coherence in this process. Different affective experiences—existential feelings, atmospheres, moods, emotions—play distinct roles. This framework reinterprets schizophrenia, depression, and anxiety spectrum disorders as disorders of affectivity, contributing to a phenomenologically informed enactive account of mental disorders.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Phenomenology philosophy Cognitive psychology Psychotherapist Epistemology |
| Citations | 9 |
| Key finding | Mental disorders can be reinterpreted as disorders of affectivity, where different forms of affective experience disrupt the progressive concretization of self-world structures in sense-making. |
Abstract
Abstract Several enactive-phenomenological perspectives have pointed to affectivity as a central aspect of mental disorders. Indeed, from an enactive perspective, sense-making is an inherently affective process. A question remains on the role of different forms of affective experiences (i.e., existential feelings, atmospheres, moods, and emotions) in sense-making and, consequently, in mental disorders. This work elaborates on the enactive perspective on mental disorders by attending to the primordial role of affectivity in the self-individuation process. Inspired by Husserl’s genetic methodology and Simondonian philosophy of individuation, sense-making is described as the process of progressive concretization and structuration of the self-world structures that support the intentionality of conscious experiences. Accordingly, affectivity is described as the force that anticipates a partial self-world coherence in sense-making. Structurally different types of affective experiences are integrated into the genetic picture and, on this basis, a reinterpretation and classification of certain mental disorders, such as schizophrenia, depression, and the anxiety spectrum, is provided. In this way, this work contributes to a phenomenologically informed enactive account of mental disorders as disorders of affectivity.