Delusional mood and affection

Delusional mood, a psychological state often preceding schizophrenia, involves a peculiar affective salience in world experience that may contribute to later delusion formation. This paper uses Edmund Husserl's account of affection and affective syntheses to clarify the nature of this experiential abnormality and explain how it leads to delusional mood. The phenomenological account is then related to the neurobiological aberrant salience hypothesis, suggesting a path toward mutual enlightenment between the two approaches.

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Abstract

Delusional mood is a well-recognized psychological state, often present in the prodromal stage of schizophrenia. Various phenomenological psychopathologists have proposed that delusional mood may not only precede but also contribute to the later formation of schizophrenic delusion. Hence, understanding experiential abnormalities involved with the delusional mood have been considered central for the understanding of schizophrenic delusion. Ranging from traditional and contemporary phenomenological and neurobiological accounts, it has been often mentioned that the peculiar affective saliency of the world experience may underpin the emergence of delusional mood. In this paper, I employ Edmund Husserl’s account of affection and affective syntheses to clarify the nature of such an experience and illuminate how this experiential abnormality contributes to the emergence of the delusional mood. I conclude by relating the phenomenological account I advance here with a neurobiological account of aberrant salience hypothesis and chart out a possible way toward mutual enlightenment for both approaches.