The Ontological, Temporal, and Teleological Unity of Consciousness and the Body: A Response to Reductionism and Dualism

A philosophical analysis of David Chalmers' hard problem of consciousness—how to explain subjective experience in physical terms—is examined through the lens of John Paul II's Theology of the Body. After reviewing Cartesian dualism, the article argues that reductionist approaches fail to account for the essential unity of the human person. This unity is described as possessing ontological, temporal, and teleological continuity, providing sacramental meaning and affirming the redemptive significance of the resurrection. The analysis carries implications for debates about engineering strong artificial intelligence from nonbiological substrates and for transhumanist ambitions.

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Abstract

David Chalmers’ so-called hard problem of consciousness is concerned with how one can give an account of phenomenal conscious experience in physicalist terms. In this article, after a brief account of Cartesian dualism, I consider how John Paul II’s Theology of the Body speaks to the prospects of a reductionist approach. This is then considered in light of Chalmers’ description of the hard problem. This analysis will have implications for related questions about the engineering of strong artificial intelligence from a nonbiological substrate as well as some of the ambitions of the transhumanist movement. I suggest that to be human is to be an essential unity—a unity of our bodies and that within us which experiences the world. Furthermore, I propose that this unity has a kind of ontological, temporal, and teleological continuity. It provides us with sacramental meaning as human persons and affirms the redemptive meaning of the resurrection.