The Poverty of Embodied Cognition

Embodied cognition proposes that cognitive processes are shaped by the body, exist to guide action, are situated in the environment, and may not require internal representations. Proponents view it as a paradigm shift for cognitive science. This critical analysis argues that the core ideas are either too vague—such as the claim that perception is influenced by the body—or offer nothing new, like the observations that cognition evolved for survival, emotions affect cognition, or perception-action couplings matter. The authors contend that embodied cognition provides no valuable insight into most classic cognitive science findings and has only trivial connections to those phenomena, nor does it adequately explain basic cognitive experiences.

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Abstract

In recent years, there has been rapidly growing interest in embodied cognition, a multifaceted theoretical proposition that (1) cognitive processes are influenced by the body, (2) cognition exists in the service of action, (3) cognition is situated in the environment, and (4) cognition may occur without internal representations. Many proponents view embodied cognition as the next great paradigm shift for cognitive science. In this article, we critically examine the core ideas from embodied cognition, taking a “thought exercise” approach. We first note that the basic principles from embodiment theory are either unacceptably vague (e.g., the premise that perception is influenced by the body) or they offer nothing new (e.g., cognition evolved to optimize survival, emotions affect cognition, perception–action couplings are important). We next suggest that, for the vast majority of classic findings in cognitive science, embodied cognition offers no scientifically valuable insight. In most cases, the theory has no logical connections to the phenomena, other than some trivially true ideas. Beyond classic laboratory findings, embodiment theory is also unable to adequately address the basic experiences of cognitive life.