Epicurean view on the validity of sensation: On the contextual reading of the content of the perception

Scholars have proposed that a contextual reading of perceptual content can defend the Epicurean view that sensations are always valid and can serve as ultimate criteria of truth. This paper examines those proposals, identifies concerns, and argues that such a contextual reading is not a viable model for reliably distinguishing truth from falsity. It also finds that the available textual evidence from Epicurean empiricist epistemology does not adequately support this reading. Finally, the authors point out further problems for the Epicurean viewpoint by drawing on later considerations in the history of the philosophy of perception, suggesting that the senses cannot provide the ultimate criteria of truth.

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Abstract

Scholars have argued that we have good reason to defend the Epicurean view of the validity of sensation on the basis of a contextual reading of the content of perception. More specifically, it has been suggested that we can respond to skeptical challenges by acknowledging the contextual character of perceptual content and by linking its truth to the conditions under which it occurs. By examining these proposals, we identify some sources of concern and point out the limitations in providing an adequate framework for the Epicurean idea that the senses are capable of providing the ultimate criteria of truth. In particular, we argue that we should be wary of a contextual reading of perceptual content, not only because this is not a viable model for reliably distinguishing truth from falsity, but also because it is not adequately supported by the available textual evidence of Epicurean empiricist epistemology. Finally, we point out further problems for the Epicurean viewpoint by drawing on some later considerations in the history of the philosophy of perception.