The Local Prospect Theory of Subjective Experience: A Soft Solution to the Hard Problem of Consciousness

Subjective experience functions as a mechanism guiding organisms toward beneficial outcomes. In simple animals, this guidance produces fitness-enhancing responses. Human consciousness offers a range of potential developments allowing free choice, modeled as a local prospect: a field of possibilities centered on the present situation and colored by valence. Building on neural models of global workspace and adaptive resonance, the theory suggests such a prospect could be implemented in the brain as a halo of activation diffusing from, and feeding back into, a core of circulating activation. Using qualia inversion, the theory argues it solves the 'hard problem of consciousness' and explains key characteristics like subjectivity, feeling, free will, agency, transience, continuity, integration, selectivity, intentionality, and 'what it is like'.

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Abstract

We propose a new theory to explain the nature and function of subjective experience, as a mechanism that guides the organism towards beneficial outcomes. In simple animals, that guidance takes the form of an affect producing a fitness-enhancing response. In human consciousness, there is not a single response, but a range of potential developments allowing a free choice. That range can be modelled as a local prospect: a field of possibilities centred on the present situation and coloured by valence. Building on neural models of global workspace and adaptive resonance, we suggest how such a prospect could be implemented in the brain: as a halo of activation diffusing from, and feeding back into, a core of circulating activation. Using the thought experiment of qualia inversion, we argue that local prospect theory solves the ‘hard problem of consciousness’. We show how our theory explains key characteristics of consciousness: subjectivity, feeling, free will, agency, transience, continuity, integration, selectivity, intentionality, and ‘what it is like’.