Animal Consciousness: The Interplay of Neural and Behavioural Evidence

The relationship between neural and behavioral evidence for animal consciousness is examined by critically reviewing two recent studies. One study on crows found different neural activity depending on whether a stimulus was reported as seen or unseen, but this implicates neural activity in consciousness only if a specific conditioned behavior is assumed to be a report of conscious experience. Another study on macaques recorded behaviors strikingly similar to patterns of conscious and unconscious perception in humans, yet confounds were only ruled out in human subjects, presupposing substantial neural similarity between humans and macaques.

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Abstract

We consider the relationship between neural and behavioural evidence for animal consciousness. We critically examine two recent studies: one neural and one behavioural. The first, on crows, finds different neural activity depending on whether a stimulus is reported as seen or unseen. However, to implicate this neural activity in consciousness, we must assume that a specific conditioned behaviour is a report of conscious experience. The second study, on macaques, records behaviours strikingly similar to patterns of conscious and unconscious perception in humans. However, confounds are only ruled out in human subjects, presupposing substantial neural similarity between humans and macaques. Taken together, the two studies reveal a sense in which neural and behavioural research rely on each other. Looking ahead, these two types of evidence could prove to be either mutually reinforcing or mutually undermining. The science of animal consciousness needs both neural and behavioural evidence, ideally obtained as part of a single coordinated programme.