Freud’s Model of the Mind Within a Predictive Processing Neuroscientific Paradigm
Erik Stänicke, Bendik Sparre Hovet, Line Indrevoll Stänicke
Entropy March 12, 2026 DOI: 10.3390/e28030318 via OpenAlex
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractThe brain's predictive processing framework, which views the brain as a prediction machine, aligns with several psychoanalytic concepts including projection, transference, wish-fulfillment, and perceptual identity. Projection in psychoanalysis is closely analogous to prediction in cognitive neuroscience, both serving to shape subjective experience and cognitive functions. The article discusses how homeostasis relates to both fields and draws parallels between insight and surprise. Limitations in equating projection with prediction are acknowledged, but integrating these frameworks may allow subjectivity to be studied scientifically.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Parallels Surprise Psychoanalytic theory Perception Cognition |
| Key finding | Psychoanalytic concepts like projection are closely analogous to predictive processing in cognitive neuroscience, suggesting a potential integration for studying subjectivity scientifically. |
Abstract
The recent paradigm shift within cognitive neuroscience toward predictive processing appears to align with many psychoanalytic conceptualizations of the mind. In this article, we argue that several psychoanalytic concepts, such as projection, transference, wish-fulfillment, and perceptual identity, are particularly compatible with the current neuroscientific conception of the brain as a prediction machine. Specifically, we propose that the concept of projection as used in modern psychoanalysis to explore subjective experience and fantasies is closely analogous to the concept of prediction as it is used to explain the fundamental cognitive functions of the brain. We discuss the implications of this parallelism for understanding the role of homeostasis in psychoanalysis and cognitive neuroscience, and we also discuss the parallels between insight and surprise in these two fields of mental science. Limitations in drawing parallels between projection and prediction are also addressed. By integrating these two fields, we envision the possibility of tackling subjectivity scientifically.