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Is Consciousness Computable? Quantifying Integrated Information Using Algorithmic Information Theory

Phil Maguire, Philippe Moser, Rebecca Maguire, Virgil Griffith

arXiv Preprint Archive May 1, 2014 via arXiv

Summary

AI-generated from the abstract

Consciousness, as proposed by Tononi's integrated information theory, is better understood as a lossless rather than a lossy integrative process. Previous formalizations relied on information loss, which would imply continuous damage to existing memories. Using algorithmic information theory, the authors formalize lossless integration and prove that complete lossless integration requires noncomputable functions. This means that if unitary consciousness exists, it cannot be modeled computationally.

Study at a glance

Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Keywords Cs.it Q-bio.nc
Key finding Complete lossless integration requires noncomputable functions, implying unitary consciousness cannot be modeled computationally.

Abstract

In this article we review Tononi's (2008) theory of consciousness as integrated information. We argue that previous formalizations of integrated information (e.g. Griffith, 2014) depend on information loss. Since lossy integration would necessitate continuous damage to existing memories, we propose it is more natural to frame consciousness as a lossless integrative process and provide a formalization of this idea using algorithmic information theory. We prove that complete lossless integration requires noncomputable functions. This result implies that if unitary consciousness exists, it cannot be modelled computationally.

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