Is Consciousness Computable? Quantifying Integrated Information Using Algorithmic Information Theory
Phil Maguire, Philippe Moser, Rebecca Maguire, Virgil Griffith
arXiv Preprint Archive May 1, 2014 via arXiv
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractConsciousness, as proposed by Tononi's integrated information theory, is better understood as a lossless rather than a lossy integrative process. Previous formalizations relied on information loss, which would imply continuous damage to existing memories. Using algorithmic information theory, the authors formalize lossless integration and prove that complete lossless integration requires noncomputable functions. This means that if unitary consciousness exists, it cannot be modeled computationally.
Study at a glance
Abstract
In this article we review Tononi's (2008) theory of consciousness as integrated information. We argue that previous formalizations of integrated information (e.g. Griffith, 2014) depend on information loss. Since lossy integration would necessitate continuous damage to existing memories, we propose it is more natural to frame consciousness as a lossless integrative process and provide a formalization of this idea using algorithmic information theory. We prove that complete lossless integration requires noncomputable functions. This result implies that if unitary consciousness exists, it cannot be modelled computationally.