The Doomsday Argument, Consciousness and Many Worlds

The doomsday argument, a probabilistic prediction of humanity's total lifespan, is fundamentally linked to consciousness. An infinite conscious lifetime is impossible even in principle. Consciousness cannot arise from a single set of deterministic laws; instead, it is generated by a superposition of brain states associated with many quasi-classical histories, each following different deterministic laws. The generalized doomsday argument makes no prediction in this framework, so the fact of consciousness itself provides evidence for a many-worlds interpretation of reality where the future is not predictable using anthropic reasoning.

Study at a glance

Abstract

The doomsday argument is a probabilistic argument that claims to predict the total lifetime of the human race. By examining the case of an individual lifetime, I conclude that the argument is fundamentally related to consciousness. I derive a reformulation stating that an infinite conscious lifetime is not possible even in principle. By considering a hypothetical conscious computer, running a non-terminating program, I deduce that consciousness cannot be generated by a single set of deterministic laws. Instead, I hypothesize that consciousness is generated by a superposition of brain states that is simultaneously associated with many quasi-classical histories, each following a different set of deterministic laws. I generalize the doomsday argument and discover that it makes no prediction in this case. Thus I conclude that the very fact of our consciousness provides us with evidence for a many-worlds interpretation of reality in which our future is not predictable using anthropic reasoning.