Mapping the structure of neural states associated with conscious experience.

A review of empirical findings on the neural organization of conscious experience finds that conscious states are consistently associated with neural activity that is restricted to low-dimensional subspaces or manifolds, structured by meaningful geometric and topological relationships, and dynamically accessible under perturbation. Distances in neural representational space track experiential similarity, categorical perceptual distinctions correspond to clustering and boundaries in neural state space, and perturbational measures distinguish accessible experiential states from inactive or fragmented configurations. The authors provide a unifying structural synthesis of empirically grounded constraints on the neural organization associated with conscious experience, without advancing a specific theory of consciousness.

Study at a glance

Abstract

A central challenge in consciousness research concerns the relationship between neural activity and conscious experience. While decades of work have identified numerous neural correlates of consciousness, these findings increasingly indicate that activation magnitude, localization, or stimulus processing alone are insufficient to account for awareness. What remains less clearly articulated is how neural activity is organized in association with conscious experience. In this review, we synthesize empirical findings that bear on the structure of neural states correlated with conscious experience. Drawing on research in neural correlates of consciousness, representational similarity analysis, neural manifold studies, perturbational approaches, and canonical sensory systems, we examine how neural activity is organized in state space across conscious and unconscious conditions. Across paradigms and measurement modalities, conscious experience is consistently associated with neural states that are restricted to admissible configurations, organized within low-dimensional subspaces or manifolds, structured by meaningful geometric and topological relationships, and dynamically accessible under perturbation. We show that distances in neural representational space track experiential similarity, that categorical perceptual distinctions correspond to clustering and boundaries in neural state space, and that perturbational measures distinguish accessible experiential states from inactive or fragmented configurations. Rather than advancing a specific theory of consciousness, this review provides a unifying structural synthesis that clarifies empirically grounded constraints on the neural organization associated with conscious experience.