Time to drop dualism and its associates: the imaginary magnitude of the hard problem of consciousness

Consciousness research has become contentious, with adversarial collaborations and open letters labeling some theories as pseudoscience, making investigation difficult. The author argues that the hard problem of consciousness and related questions may not be well-posed. A more precise approach is proposed: rather than defining consciousness with strict statements, researchers should examine its physical and conceptual constituents. This shift aims to clarify common queries about the source and emergence of conscious experience.

Study at a glance

Abstract

The field of consciousness research has reached a somewhat contentious atmosphere. From “adversarial collaborations”, where consciousness theories compete, to open letters where researchers label some theories as pseudoscience, the subject is becoming harder to investigate and results difficult to interpret as there is still a significant aura of mysticism rooted in dualism and its modern associate, the hard problem of consciousness. It is therefore time we confront the uncertainty about whether this problem and the questions that derive from it are well-posed. I address the possibility that these problems and questions are not as well-posed as originally assumed. A more precise avenue is offered to clarify common queries in this field about the source and emergence of conscious experience, starting from the proposal to discard the attempts at defining consciousness in the classical manner using strict statements, and to pay attention to its constituents, both physical and conceptual.