Consciousness and Qualia

Consciousness involves qualitative experiences—pains, colors, sounds—called qualia, which are problematic because they seem to lack something that bears or owns them. The usual candidates for this ownership relation, such as introspection or higher-level thoughts, fail to explain what it means to have a quale. The author solves both problems with bundle theories: phenomenal objects are bundles of qualia, eliminating the need for separate bearers, and the self is a bundle, so having a quale simply means it belongs to the bundle one is. The argument prioritizes phenomenological adequacy and the first-person perspective.

Study at a glance

Abstract

This is a philosophical study of qualitative consciousness, characteristic examples of which are pains, experienced colors, sounds, etc. Consciousness is analyzed as the having of qualia. Phenomenal properties or qualia are problematical because they lack appropriate bearers. The relation of having is problematical because none of the typical candidates for this relation — introspection, inner monitoring, higher level thoughts — is capable of explaining what it looks like to have a quale . The qualia problem is solved by introducing a bundle theory of phenomenal objects. Phenomenal objects are bundles of qualia. Thus there is no need for independent qualia bearers. The having problem is solved by introducing a bundle theory of the self. To have a quale is for it to be in the bundle one is. Thus no further relations are needed to explain how qualia are had. This study strives for phenomenological adequacy. Thus the first-person point of view dominates throughout. (Series A)