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A Naturalistic Approach to the Hard Problem of Consciousness

Wolf Singer

Frontiers in Systems Neuroscience October 25, 2019 DOI: 10.3389/fnsys.2019.00058 via DOAJ

Summary

AI-generated from the abstract

The hard problem of consciousness—explaining how subjective experience arises from material brain processes—cannot be solved by studying neural correlates alone. Instead, the problem can be addressed within a naturalistic evolutionary framework that includes both biological and socio-cultural dimensions. Perceptions, including self-perception, are constructed based on prior knowledge. Social interactions among cognitively capable agents generate immaterial social or cultural realities that become new priors. These priors shape a self-model with both material and immaterial aspects, experienced as veridical because they are implicit and not consciously accessible. Thus, the hard problem appears as a cognitive construct amenable to naturalistic explanation.

Study at a glance

Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Keywords Consciousness Dualism Social realities Qualia Emergence
Key finding The hard problem of consciousness can be treated within a naturalistic framework by considering socio-cultural evolutionary dimensions that generate immaterial realities acting as priors for self-perception.

Abstract

Following a brief review of current efforts to identify the neuronal correlates of conscious processing (NCCP) an attempt is made to bridge the gap between the material neuronal processes and the immaterial dimensions of subjective experience. It is argued that this “hard problem” of consciousness research cannot be solved by only considering the neuronal underpinnings of cognition. The proposal is that the hard problem can be treated within a naturalistic framework if one considers not only the biological but also the socio-cultural dimensions of evolution. The argument is based on the following premises: perceptions are the result of a constructivist process that depends on priors. This applies both for perceptions of the outer world and the perception of oneself. Social interactions between agents endowed with the cognitive abilities of humans generated immaterial realities, addressed as social or cultural realities. This novel class of realities assumed the role of priors for the perception of oneself and the embedding world. A natural consequence of these extended perceptions is a dualist classification of observables into material and immaterial phenomena nurturing the concept of ontological substance dualism. It is argued that perceptions shaped by socio-cultural priors lead to the construction of a self-model that has both a material and an immaterial dimension. As priors are implicit and not amenable to conscious recollection the perceived immaterial dimension is experienced as veridical and not derivable from material processes—which is the hallmark of the hard problem. These considerations let the hard problem appear as the result of cognitive constructs that are amenable to naturalistic explanations in an evolutionary framework.

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