Between the mind and the senses: Jean Mitry’s approach to cinematic consciousness

Representing altered states of consciousness through technical images is inherently contradictory because attributing a physical body to mental images denies their essence, as Husserl argued. Jean Mitry drew on this assumption when examining filmic access to mental states from a phenomenological perspective. This essay reconsiders Mitry's contribution, focusing on the role of projection—both technical and metaphorical—in cinematic technique and imagination. It aims to raise crucial questions for comparing filmic forms of the visible with those introduced by virtual technology.

Study at a glance

Abstract

Representing altered states of consciousness, even through the most phantasmal of technical images, is an inherent contradiction; once we attribute a physical body, i.e. objectivity, to mental images, we deny what Husserl considers their very essence. Jean Mitry draws from this assumption when discussing filmic access to mental states from a phenomenological perspective. The following essay reconsiders Mitry’s contribution with specific reference to the role of projection, technically and metaphorically speaking, in the cinematic technique and imagination; this, with the intention of suggesting some crucial questions for the comparison between the filmic forms of the visible and those inaugurated by the technology of the virtual.