Skip to content

Testing circuit-level theories of consciousness in humans.

Trends Cogn Sci September 20, 2025 DOI: 10.1016/j.tics.2025.08.012 via PubMed Central

Summary

AI-generated from the abstract

Most knowledge about the neural basis of consciousness comes from large-scale brain activity patterns measured with fMRI or M/EEG, while circuit-level mechanisms—which likely underlie those larger patterns—remain poorly understood, especially in humans. This review examines circuit-level theories such as apical amplification theory and dendritic integration theory, and argues that these can now be tested in humans using advanced methods. Testing such theories would help translate consciousness research into clinical practice and bridge circuit-level and network-level accounts of consciousness.

Study at a glance

Characteristics Review Peer reviewed
Key finding Circuit-level theories of consciousness can now be tested in humans using state-of-the-art methods, which could bridge circuit- and network-level theories and aid clinical translation.

Abstract

Our understanding of the neural basis of consciousness is mostly restricted to large-scale brain activity patterns as measured by methods such as functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and magneto/electro-encephalography (M/EEG). In contrast, we lack even basic understanding of circuit-level mechanisms supporting consciousness - particularly in humans - despite the fundamental role that such mechanisms likely play in instantiating larger-scale brain activity patterns supporting conscious states and contents. Here, we review what progress has been made on circuit-level theories of consciousness (e.g., apical amplification theory, dendritic integration theory) and argue that such theories can be tested in humans using recently developed, state-of-the-art methods. Doing so will further facilitate translation of consciousness science into clinical settings and strengthen the bridge between circuit- and network-level theories of consciousness.

Comments

No comments yet.

Log in to comment