The Newman problem of consciousness science

The Newman problem threatens structural assumptions and theories across philosophy and science. In consciousness science, it undermines structuralist approaches and theories of consciousness if not properly addressed. However, when phenomenal spaces and mathematical structures of conscious experience are correctly understood, the Newman problem does not arise. Consciousness science must carefully choose which definition of structure to adopt; doing so makes the problem disappear.

Study at a glance

Abstract

The Newman problem is a fundamental problem that threatens to undermine structural assumptions and structural theories throughout philosophy and science. Here, we consider the problem in the context of consciousness science. We introduce and discuss the problem, and explain why it is detrimental not only to structuralist assumptions, but also to theories of consciousness, if left unconsidered. However, we show that if phenomenal spaces, and mathematical structures of conscious experience more generally, are understood in the right way, the Newman problem does not arise. The upshot of this paper is that consciousness science needs to be careful in which definition of structure to consider, but if it is, the Newman problem disappears.