Evaluating Panpsychism

Panpsychism—the view that consciousness is a fundamental feature of reality—is more likely to succeed as a theory of consciousness if it meets two conditions: compatibility with Integrated Information Theory (IIT) and a preliminary solution to the combination problem (how micro-level conscious experiences combine into macro-level ones). Evaluating constitutive, emergent, and panprotopsychist versions, the article concludes that weak emergent panpsychism, along with panqualitivist and panexperientialist panprotopsychism (or a combination), shows genuine potential for panpsychism to remain a coherent and viable position.

Study at a glance

Abstract

In this article, I evaluate which version of panpsychism is best suited to address the challenges faced by a theory of consciousness. I first argue that a panpsychist theory is more likely to be successful if it meets two conditions: (1) it must be compatible with the Integrated Information Theory (IIT), and (2) it must provide at least a preliminary indication of how to solve the combination problem. I consider three main versions of panpsychism: constitutive panpsychism micropanpsychism and cosmopanpsychism), emergent panpsychism (strong and weak), and panprotopsychism (panqualitivist and panexperientialist). I conclude that weak emergent panpsychism, together with the two variants of panprotopsychism (panqualitivism and panexperientialism), or a combination of these approaches, shows genuine potential for panpsychism to remain a coherent and viable position.