Neurophenomenal structuralism as a general theory of consciousness?

Neurophenomenal structuralism (NPS) is usually taken to explain why a conscious experience has a specific feel, but Sascha Fink proposes it can also explain why one has any experience at all. Fink argues that the structures determining an experience's character are embedded in larger meta-structures that make those structures conscious and add their own Gestalt phenomenology. This paper examines Fink's generalized NPS+ and raises three objections: unconscious Gestalten exist, some experiences like Ganzfeld lack Gestalt-structures, and one-factor NPS+ faces a mirroring dilemma between regress and loss of methodological promise. Two further challenges for two-factor NPS+ concern why adding structures makes features conscious and why only some neural structures are selected for consciousness.

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Abstract

While neurophenomenal structuralism (NPS) is typically viewed as an account of why an experience, i.e. a conscious mental state, has a specific phenomenal character, Sascha Fink has suggested that NPS might also account for why one has an experience in the first place. According to Fink, the character-determining structures are incorporated in larger (meta-)structures that make the incorporated structures conscious, while also contributing their own Gestalt-related phenomenology. We examine the commitments of such generalized ‘NPS+’, formulating three challenges for Fink’s approach. According to the unconsciously perceived gist objection, there is evidence for unconscious Gestalten, which suggests that the Gestalt-forming mechanism fails to make the relevant mental state conscious. Moreover, the existence of Ganzfeld experiences suggests that some experiences lack Gestalt-structures. Thirdly, as we explain, proponents of one-factor NPS+ face the mirroring dilemma of having to choose between a vicious regress of incorporating structures, and compromising their theory’s methodological promise. We then formulate two challenges for any two-factor form of NPS+: The more of the same challenge concerns the question of why adding more structures to content-related structural features makes these features conscious, while the structure-selection challenge concerns the question of why some neural structures, but not others, are selected for consciousness.