Why fish pain cannot and should not be ruled out
Animal Sentience January 1, 2016 DOI: 10.51291/2377-7478.1038 via OpenAlex
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractThe question of whether fish consciously feel pain cannot be settled by looking for the same neural mechanisms that underlie human pain reports. Non-mammalian consciousness, if it exists, may rely on different mechanisms. Neurophysiological and behavioral evidence, evolutionary considerations, and Bayesian brain theories suggest that if fish can feel at all, they can feel pain. Because pain and suffering are qualitative experiences, the precautionary principle obliges us to accommodate the possibility that fish feel pain where doubt remains.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Qualitative Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Consciousness Fish <actinopterygii> Key lock Cognitive psychology Cognitive science |
| Citations | 49 |
| Key finding | The strategy of identifying human-like neural mechanisms for pain in fish fails, and evidence suggests that if fish can feel at all, they can feel pain, obliging precaution. |
Abstract
Do fish consciously feel pain? Addressing this question, Key (2016) asks whether the neural mechanisms underlying conscious pain reports in humans can be identified in fish. This strategy fails in three ways. First, non-mammalian consciousness — if it exists — may depend on different mechanisms. Second, accumulating neurophysiological and behavioural evidence, evolutionary considerations, and emerging Bayesian brain theories suggest that if fish can feel at all, they can feel pain. Finally, the qualitative nature of pain and suffering obliges us, via the precautionary principle, to accommodate the possibility of its existence where doubt remains.