Measuring Autonomy and Emergence via Granger Causality
Artificial Life January 12, 2010 DOI: 10.1162/artl.2010.16.2.16204 via OpenAlex
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractQuantitative measures for autonomy and emergence, grounded in Granger causality and multivariate autoregression, are introduced and validated. G-autonomy quantifies how much a variable's past predicts its own future beyond external factors, while G-emergence measures a process's simultaneous dependence on and autonomy from its underlying causes. Applied to agent-based models, evolutionary adaptation increases autonomy in a predation model, and a flocking model demonstrates both emergence and downward causation. The work connects these measures to broader discussions of autonomy, emergence, and consciousness.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Autonomy Granger causality Causality physics Consciousness Process computing |
| Citations | 85 |
| Key finding | Quantitative measures of autonomy and emergence, based on Granger causality, can be validated through agent-based models and relate to concepts of consciousness. |
Abstract
Concepts of emergence and autonomy are central to artificial life and related cognitive and behavioral sciences. However, quantitative and easy-to-apply measures of these phenomena are mostly lacking. Here, I describe quantitative and practicable measures for both autonomy and emergence, based on the framework of multivariate autoregression and specifically Granger causality. G-autonomy measures the extent to which the knowing the past of a variable helps predict its future, as compared to predictions based on past states of external (environmental) variables. G-emergence measures the extent to which a process is both dependent upon and autonomous from its underlying causal factors. These measures are validated by application to agent-based models of predation (for autonomy) and flocking (for emergence). In the former, evolutionary adaptation enhances autonomy; the latter model illustrates not only emergence but also downward causation. I end with a discussion of relations among autonomy, emergence, and consciousness.