Experiential Set Monism (ESM): Dissolving the Hard Problem of Consciousness

Subjective experience is not produced by the brain but is the intrinsic nature of matter itself. The hard problem of consciousness arises from a cognitive mistake: projecting a mental model of inertness onto the nervous system. The framework, Experiential Set Monism (ESM), rests on five postulates and treats each experiential set as ontologically complete at its own scale, thereby dissolving the combination problem and the phylogenetic threshold problem. The theory yields testable predictions in neuroscience and artificial intelligence.

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Abstract

This article presents Experiential Set Monism (ESM), a panexperientialist framework that dissolves the hard problem of consciousness. We argue that subjective experience is notan emergent product of matter, but its intrinsic nature. The hard problem arises from a categorical error: the projection of a "marker of inertness"-a cognitive heuristic thatmodels the world as non-experiential-onto the nervous system itself.The framework is built on five core postulates:(1) Experience-Physics Identity, (2) The Marker of Inertness, (3) Specificity by Pattern, (4) Ownership Attribution Algorithms, (5) The Dissolution of the Hard Problem. We extend this foundation with a theory of experiential sets, which dissolves the combination problem and the phylogenetic threshold problem by treating each set as ontologically complete at its own scale. The theory generates testable predictions in neuroscience and artificial intelligence.This is the second, revised version of the article. The theory has been renamed from Computational Experiential Monism (CEM) to Experiential Set Monism (ESM), the structure has been reorganized and several sections have been refined.Keywords:consciousness, hard problem, panexperientialism, informational, property attribution, experiential sets, artificial intelligence, philosophy of mind