Metacognition bridges experiences and beliefs in sense of agency.

People's explicit beliefs about being an agent are not directly tied to how often they feel a sense of agency during sensorimotor tasks. Instead, the connection runs through metacognition: individuals who are less sensitive to cues indicating self-causation tend to report more negative agency beliefs, but this relationship disappears when accounting for their ability to accurately monitor their own judgments. Positive agency beliefs showed no clear link to sensorimotor measures. The findings suggest that introspective access, rather than the raw experience of agency, shapes one's enduring beliefs about being an agent.

Study at a glance

Abstract

Cognitive scientists differentiate the "minimal self" - subjective experiences of agency and ownership in our sensorimotor interactions with the world - from declarative beliefs about the self that are sustained over time. However, it remains an open question how individual sensory experiences of agency are integrated into the belief ofbeing an agent.We administered a sensorimotor task to measure subjects' (n = 195) propensity to classify stimuli as self-caused and metacognitive monitoring of such judgements, and we compared these behavioral metrics to declarative beliefs about their agency. Subjects who were less sensitive to control cues also reported more negative agency beliefs, though positive beliefs were not clearly correlated with any sensorimotor measure. Importantly, this relationship between first-order sensitivity and declarative beliefs essentially disappears when controlling for metacognitive sensitivity. Results suggest agency beliefs are not related directly to the propensity to make positive agency judgements but are connected through introspective access.