What It Feels Like To Hear Voices: Fond Memories of Julian Jaynes
arXiv Preprint Archive August 26, 2008 via arXiv
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractConsciousness is argued to be the capacity to feel, making all mammals—and likely lower vertebrates and invertebrates—conscious, contrary to Julian Jaynes's theory that denied consciousness to language-less dogs and to ancient Greeks who heard gods' voices. Jaynes's humanitarian convictions prevented him from harming animals, yet his theory posits that those without introspective self-awareness, including bicameral-era humans, were not conscious. Despite this disagreement, Jaynes's analysis of consciousness continues to inspire inquiry into the mind/body problem and its links to cognition and language.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Consciousness-studies Cognitive-linguistics cs.cl Ancient-greek-history Philosophy-of-mind Auditory-perception |
| Key finding | Consciousness is defined as the ability to feel, which extends to all mammals and likely other animals, contradicting Jaynes's view that consciousness requires language and introspection. |
Abstract
Julian Jaynes's profound humanitarian convictions not only prevented him from going to war, but would have prevented him from ever kicking a dog. Yet according to his theory, not only are language-less dogs unconscious, but so too were the speaking/hearing Greeks in the Bicameral Era, when they heard gods' voices telling them what to do rather than thinking for themselves. I argue that to be conscious is to be able to feel, and that all mammals (and probably lower vertebrates and invertebrates too) feel, hence are conscious. Julian Jaynes's brilliant analysis of our concepts of consciousness nevertheless keeps inspiring ever more inquiry and insights into the age-old mind/body problem and its relation to cognition and language.