On the evolution of phenomenal consciousness
Jean-Louis Dessalles, Tiziana Zalla
arXiv Preprint Archive August 22, 2011 via arXiv
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractPhenomenal consciousness—the capacity to experience sensations like pain, pleasure, colors, and sounds—is likely shared with many animals. Because it is a biological trait, natural selection should explain its existence. The authors argue that phenomenal consciousness is not an epiphenomenon but has an adaptive function: it labels mental representations, allowing organisms to discriminate and evaluate them. They discuss whether consciousness itself was selected for this labeling role.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Consciousness Neuroscience q-bio.nc Evolution Sensory perception Animal cognition |
| Key finding | Phenomenal consciousness serves an adaptive function by labeling mental representations for discrimination and evaluation, rather than being an epiphenomenon. |
Abstract
A number of concepts are included in the term 'consciousness'. We choose to concentrate here on phenomenal consciousness, the process through which we are able to experience aspects of our environment or of our physical state. We probably share this aspect of consciousness with many animals which, like us, feel pain or pleasure and experience colours, sounds, flavours, etc. Since phenomenal consciousness is a feature of some living species, we should be able to account for it in terms of natural selection. Does it have an adaptive function, or is it an epiphenomenon ? We shall give arguments to reject the second alternative. We propose that phenomenal properties of consciousness are involved in a labelling process that allows us to discriminate and to evaluate mental representations. We also discuss to what extent consciousness as such has been selected for this labelling function.