Self and Knowledge in Psychedelic Therapy

The author defends two central claims from their book Philosophy of Psychedelics: that psychedelic therapy works mainly by altering mental representations of the self, and that it yields epistemic benefits compatible with a naturalistic worldview. In response to commentaries, the author agrees with some supplementary mechanistic points from Hoffman and from Martin and Sterzer, while offering qualifications. The author also engages with challenges from Lyon, Farrenikova, and Colombo, defending core commitments. On epistemology, the author endorses connections to agency-first epistemology and self know-how from Bortolotti and Murphy-Hollies, and engages with Caporuscio's concept of self-shaping, again with qualifications. Finally, the author is sympathetic to Fink's proposal that the main epistemic benefit is increased understanding, but criticizes arguments for Psychedelic Justification Impossibilism.

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Abstract

Much of my book Philosophy of Psychedelics is devoted to elaborating and defending two basic claims: that psychedelic therapy works mainly by changing mental representations of the self, and that it has many epistemic benefits consistent with a naturalistic worldview. The commentaries in this symposium generally focus on one or the other of these claims. On the mechanistic front, the commentaries by Hoffman and by Martin and Sterzer seek to supplement my account by drawing attention to factors it does not emphasize. In this reply I agree with most of their claims, but propose some important qualifications. Meanwhile, the commentaries by Lyon and Farrenikova and by Colombo challenge some core commitments of my account. I agree with many of their claims, but defend some of these core commitments. On the epistemological front, Bortolotti and Murphy-Hollies endorse the overall shape of my account and make some productive connections to ideas concerning agency-first epistemology and self know-how. Caporuscio brings into play the idea of self-shaping, which connects to self know-how, but argues against certain core claims of my account. I endorse many of these claims about agency-first, self know-how, and self-shaping, but propose some important qualifications. Finally, Fink agrees that psychedelic experiences can have some epistemic benefits, but argues that these do not pertain to epistemic justification, and that the main benefit is increased understanding. I am sympathetic to Fink’s proposal about understanding, but criticize some of his arguments for the thesis of Psychedelic Justification Impossibilism.