Moral Intuition Regarding the Possibility of Conscious Human Brain Organoids: An Experimental Ethics Study.

Summary

People's intuitive moral judgments about actions toward human brain organoids (HBOs) are influenced not only by whether the organoids can experience pain (a valenced experience) but also by whether they can have visual experiences (a non-valenced experience). In an empirical study, participants judged the permissibility of creating and destroying HBOs differently depending on whether the organoids were described as capable of pain or of visual experience. These results suggest that the moral status people attribute to conscious HBOs is sensitive to the value of phenomenal consciousness itself, independent of its valence.

Study at a glance

Abstract

The moral status of human brain organoids (HBOs) has been debated in view of the future possibility that they may acquire phenomenal consciousness. This study empirically investigates the moral sensitivity in people's intuitive judgments about actions toward conscious HBOs. The results showed that the presence/absence of pain experience in HBOs affected the judgment about the moral permissibility of actions such as creating and destroying the HBOs; however, the presence/absence of visual experience in HBOs also affected the judgment. These findings suggest that people's intuitive judgments about the moral status of HBOs are sensitive to the valence-independent value of phenomenal consciousness. We discuss how these observations can have normative implications; particularly, we argue that they put pressure on the theoretical view that the moral status of conscious HBOs is grounded solely in the valence-dependent value of consciousness. We also discuss how our findings can be informative even when such a theoretical view is finally justified or when the future possibility of conscious HBOs is implausible.