Sentience, Vulcans, and zombies: the value of phenomenal consciousness.

Summary

The paper argues that if valenced or affective experience is not essential for moral significance, as illustrated by hypothetical Vulcans who are conscious but lack affect, then one should be pressured to accept that consciousness itself may not be necessary for well-being, moral status, or psychological intrinsic value. It examines three positions: valence sentientism (valenced experience is necessary), broad sentientism (phenomenal consciousness generally is necessary), and non-necessitarianism (consciousness is unnecessary). The author contends that rejecting valence sentientism in light of Vulcans leads to accepting non-necessitarianism.

Study at a glance

Abstract

Many think that a specific aspect of phenomenal consciousness-valenced or affective experience-is essential to consciousness's moral significance (valence sentientism). They hold that valenced experience is necessary for well-being, or moral status, or psychological intrinsic value (or all three). Some think that phenomenal consciousness generally is necessary for non-derivative moral significance (broad sentientism). Few think that consciousness is unnecessary for moral significance (non-necessitarianism). In this paper, I consider the prospects for these views. I first consider the prospects for valence sentientism in light of Vulcans, beings who are conscious but without affect or valence of any sort. I think Vulcans pressure us to accept broad sentientism. But I argue that a consideration of explanations for broad sentientism opens up possible explanations for non-necessitarianism about the moral significance of consciousness. That is, once one leans away from valence sentientism because of Vulcans, one should feel pressure to accept a view on which consciousness is not necessary for well-being, moral status, or psychological intrinsic value.