The paper argues that if valenced or affective experience is not essential for moral significance, as illustrated by hypothetical Vulcans who are conscious but lack affect, then one should be pressured to accept that consciousness itself may not be necessary for well-being, moral status, or psychological intrinsic value. It examines three positions: valence sentientism (valenced experience is necessary), broad sentientism (phenomenal consciousness generally is necessary), and non-necessitarianism (consciousness is unnecessary). The author contends that rejecting valence sentientism in light of Vulcans leads to accepting non-necessitarianism.
Consciousness is relevant to three distinct ethical issues: an entity's moral status, moral responsibility for actions, and the acquisition of moral knowledge. Despite these different connections, it remains unclear what exactly about consciousness makes it intuitively important for each area. The chapter explores whether there might be a common thread linking these issues, concluding that this possibility remains open.
This chapter examines the nature and sources of agentive phenomenology—the experiences associated with intentional actions. It reviews pioneering work from the early 1980s in psychology and neuroscience that motivates much current research. The discussion covers the scope of these experiences, their relationship to other types of experiences, how best to characterize different aspects, and the function of various agentive experiences.