The Experience of Agency
Myrto Mylopoulos, Joshua Shepherd
The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness July 9, 2020 DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198749677.013.8
Summary
This chapter examines the nature and sources of agentive phenomenology—the experiences associated with intentional actions. It reviews pioneering work from the early 1980s in psychology and neuroscience that motivates much current research. The discussion covers the scope of these experiences, their relationship to other types of experiences, how best to characterize different aspects, and the function of various agentive experiences.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key finding | Agentive phenomenology encompasses a set of experience-types tied to intentional actions, and its nature and function raise questions about scope, relationship to other experiences, characterization, and function. |
Abstract
This chapter reflects on questions about the nature and sources of agentive phenomenology—that is, the set of those experience-types associated with exercises of agency, and paradigmatically with intentional actions. The discussion begins with pioneering work in psychology and neuroscience that dates to the early 1980s. Much of the current work on agentive phenomenology in both psychology and philosophy draws motivation from this work, and the questions it raises. After discussing empirical work relevant to agentive phenomenology, the chapter considers its nature, covering questions about the scope of agentive phenomenology, about its relationship to other types of experiences, about the best way to characterize aspects of agentive phenomenology, and about the function of various types of agentive experience.