The paper argues that algorithms are a kind of functional moral zombie, lacking sentience, and therefore cannot be autonomous or accountable moral agents. Just as philosophical zombies—exact physical duplicates of conscious beings without subjective experience—are used to challenge physicalism, algorithms similarly lack the experiential knowledge needed for moral understanding. Without feeling, an algorithm cannot truly value anything or act for moral reasons; its 'values' are merely prioritized items on a list. The author contends that moral agency requires sentience, so both zombies and algorithms are incoherent as morally responsible agents.
The paper argues that if valenced or affective experience is not essential for moral significance, as illustrated by hypothetical Vulcans who are conscious but lack affect, then one should be pressured to accept that consciousness itself may not be necessary for well-being, moral status, or psychological intrinsic value. It examines three positions: valence sentientism (valenced experience is necessary), broad sentientism (phenomenal consciousness generally is necessary), and non-necessitarianism (consciousness is unnecessary). The author contends that rejecting valence sentientism in light of Vulcans leads to accepting non-necessitarianism.