Reconsidering the ignorabimus: du Bois-Reymond and the hard problem of consciousness.
Science in context – March 01, 2020
Source: PubMed
Summary
Du Bois-Reymond's thesis on the impossibility of scientifically explaining consciousness resonates strongly today, highlighting a significant epistemological dilemma. An analysis of his 1872 speech reveals parallels with modern debates surrounding the "hard problem of consciousness." His skepticism stemmed from the speculative nature of 19th-century philosophy and neurophysiology. Revisiting his ideas offers valuable insights into contemporary neuroscience, materialism, and mysterianism, suggesting that understanding historical perspectives can illuminate ongoing challenges in consciousness studies, ultimately benefiting current discourse in the field.
Abstract
In this paper I present an interpretation of du Bois-Reymond's thesis on the impossibility of a scientific explanation of consciousness and of its present importance. I reconsider du Bois-Reymond's speech "On the limits of natural science" (1872) in the context of nineteenth-century German philosophy and neurophysiology, pointing out connections and analogies with contemporary arguments on the "hard problem of consciousness." Du Bois-Reymond's position turns out to be grounded on an epistemological argument and characterized by a metaphysical skepticism, motivated by the unfruitful speculative tendency of contemporary German philosophy and natural science. In the final sections, I show how contemporary research can benefit from a reconsideration of this position and its context of emergence, which is a good vantage point to trace open problems in consciousness studies back to their historical development.