Dissociative Multiplicity and Psychoanalysis.

Summary

Dissociative multiplicity—the presence of more than one center of consciousness or 'I,' as seen in Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID) and subthreshold DID (OSDD-1)—poses a fundamental challenge for classical psychoanalysis. Classic constructs such as splitting, repression, triadic models (oedipal, topographic, structural, Fairbairnian, Kohutian), object relations, and attachment theory cannot fully account for this phenomenon, though they remain partially applicable. The paper explains why these frameworks fall short and reflects on what is needed to reintegrate dissociation into mainstream psychoanalytic theory and practice.

Study at a glance

Abstract

This paper examines the relationship between psychoanalysis and trauma, focusing specifically on dissociation-and, more narrowly, on dissociative multiplicity, the most challenging form for psychoanalysis to address. Dissociative multiplicity involves the presence of more than one center of consciousness, more than one "I," a feature of multiple personality, now called Dissociative Identity Disorder or DID, and OSDD-1, or subthreshold DID. The central question is whether classic psychoanalytic constructs, such as splitting, repression, various triadic views (oedipal, topographic, structural, Fairbairnian, Kohutian), object relations, and attachment theory, can adequately account for dissociative multiplicity. I explain how they cannot, but also how they remain applicable to multiplicity. I conclude with a summary view and reflection on what still needs to occur to reintegrate dissociation into mainstream psychoanalytic theory and practice.