Pragmatism as Idealism? The Case of Mary Whiton Calkins.
Journal of the history of the behavioral sciences – April 01, 2025
Source: PubMed
Summary
Mary Whiton Calkins, a pioneering figure in American psychology, challenged conventional wisdom by arguing that pragmatism and idealism weren't opposing philosophies but complementary approaches. Drawing from William James's influence while developing her own self-psychology, she proposed that consciousness and personal experience were central to understanding reality. Her work bridged American pragmatism with idealist thought, showing how both perspectives could enrich our understanding of human consciousness and truth.
Abstract
American pragmatism is traditionally described as a logico-philosophical movement that arose in opposition to the theological and metaphysical assumptions of the early American idealists. Mary Whiton Calkins (1863-1930) challenges this narrative in two central ways: she presents pragmatism as encompassing psychological, logical, and metaphysical doctrines, and she characterizes "metaphysical pragmatism" as a form of idealism. This paper offers a systematic reconstruction of Calkins's philosophical and psychological commitments to explain these challenges to the traditional narrative. The first part proposes that Calkins's taxonomy of "pragmatisms" reflects her views on the proper roles of philosophy and psychology. During a time when psychology was separating from philosophy, Calkins argued that psychology should study reality as experienced through introspection, while philosophy should address the metaphysical nature of the realities experienced. The second part of this article explores Calkins's rationale for characterizing metaphysical pragmatism as idealism. She understood the pluralism characteristic of pragmatism as a "pluralistic personalism", where reality is the nature of consciousness, and consciousness is viewed as a plurality of conscious selves. Calkins rejected metaphysical pragmatism because she believed that pluralism could not account for absolute truth. However, she maintained support for psychological pragmatism, believing it to be metaphysically neutral. The article concludes with a brief critical analysis of Calkins's position on pragmatism as regards her philosophy-psychology distinction and the supposed opposition between pragmatism and metaphysics more broadly.