A dualist theory of experience.
Philosophical studies – January 01, 2025
Source: PubMed
Summary
Our conscious experiences may be more than just brain activity. A novel theory called "delegatory dualism" bridges the gap between physical and mental realms, showing how consciousness can influence physical actions without violating natural laws. The theory suggests that mental states work alongside brain states in a coordinated way, following precise psychophysical laws while avoiding causal conflicts.
Abstract
Dualism holds that experiences somehow arise from physical states, despite being neither identical with nor grounded in such states. This paper motivates a stringent set of constraints on constructing a dualist theory of experience. To meet the constraints, a dualist theory must: (1) construe experiences as causes of physical effects, (2) ensure that experiences do not cause observable violations of the causal closure of the physical domain, (3) avoid overdetermination, (4) specify a set of psychophysical laws that yield experiences as a function of physical states, and (5) ensure that functional duplication preserves phenomenology. After motivating these constraints and explaining why existing dualist theories satisfy only some of them, I construct a dualist theory that satisfies all of them. On the resulting theory-which I call delegatory dualism-experiences uphold causal responsibilities "delegated" to them by physical states.