Temporal Consciousness
The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness July 9, 2020 Peer reviewed DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198749677.013.9
Summary
The chapter discusses the nature of temporal consciousness by addressing three main questions about how sensory experiences convey information about time, the role of temporal properties in conscious experiences, and how these representations affect our phenomenological understanding. It reviews various existing theories related to these questions and critically examines key arguments in the ongoing debate.
Abstract
The temporal aspects of experience raise three related questions, central to our understanding of temporal consciousness: how do sensory experiences carry information about, or make us aware of, some of the temporal features of perceived events (if at all)—in what format, by what mechanisms?; do the temporal properties of conscious experiences—including the arrangement of their temporal parts—play any role in how these experiences present or represent the temporal properties of perceived events?; how does such temporal representation manifest itself in the phenomenology of the relevant experiences? Most theories of temporal consciousness can be divided in terms of how they treat these questions. This chapter begins with a brief sketch of the main theories currently on the market and some of their background assumptions; it then moves to a—also brief—critical review of some of the arguments at the centre of the dispute.