On a confusion about there being two types of consciousness.
Liad Mudrik, Nathan Faivre, Michael Pitts, Aaron Schurger
Trends in cognitive sciences December 17, 2025 Peer reviewed DOI: 10.1016/j.tics.2025.11.012 via PubMed
Summary
The study suggests that the longstanding debate in consciousness theories, particularly the distinction between phenomenal consciousness (P) and access consciousness (A), should be reframed. Instead of viewing P and A as separate types, they should be seen as necessary conditions for consciousness. This new perspective may help address unresolved questions regarding the neural mechanisms, functions of consciousness, and its relationship with attention.
Study at a glance
| Key finding | P and A are proposed to be necessary conditions for consciousness rather than two distinct types. |
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Abstract
Progress in the scientific study of consciousness has been impeded by several fundamental controversies. One pertains to a major divide between theories: sensory versus cognitive. Here, we argue that the key to resolving this controversy is to reevaluate the conceptual distinction proposed by Block in 1995 between phenomenal consciousness (P) and access consciousness (A). We propose that P and A should not be understood as two different types of consciousness, but as two necessary conditions for consciousness. We illustrate how this conceptual shift allows making substantial progress in answering several unresolved questions, such as the neural mechanisms and functions of consciousness, and the relationship between consciousness and attention. Our proposal motivates a selective unification across these different classes of theories.