The mind-body problem in the philosophy of mind and cognitive neuroscience: a physicalist naturalist solution.
Neurological sciences : official journal of the Italian Neurological Society and of the Italian Society of Clinical Neurophysiology September 1, 2018 Peer reviewed DOI: 10.1007/s10072-018-3455-6 via PubMed
Summary
The analysis suggests that three key characteristics of visual perception—being conscious, self-conscious, and content-provided—are neurologically represented by distinct higher order properties of brain dynamics. This leads to a physicalist solution to the mind-body problem, proposing that primary phenomenal consciousness is not a non-physical substance or property, but rather a format created by the brain to align its dynamics with environmental interactions during action.
Study at a glance
| Key finding | Three distinct higher order properties of brain dynamics implement the fundamental characteristics of visual perception. |
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Abstract
Using an analysis of a voluntary action caused by a visual perception, I suggest that the three fundamental characteristics of this perception (being conscious, self-conscious, and provided with a content) are neurologically implemented by three distinct higher order properties of brain dynamics. This hypothesis allows me to sketch out a physicalist naturalist solution to the mind-body problem. According to this solution, primary phenomenal consciousness is neither a non-physical substance, nor a non-physical property but simply the "format" that the brain gives to a part of its dynamics in order to obtain a fine tuning with its environment when the body acts on it.