The status of consciousness in nature

Summary

The abstract discusses different philosophical positions regarding consciousness, focusing on the relationship between explanatory and ontological gaps. It highlights a common view that science may not explain consciousness, leading to debates about whether this implies an ontological gap. The author introduces a fourth perspective suggesting that while there is an ontological gap, there is no explanatory gap, contributing to the ongoing discourse on the nature of consciousness.

Study at a glance

Abstract

The most central metaphysical question about phenomenal consciousness is that of what constitutes phenomenal consciousness, whereas the most central epistemic question about consciousness is that of whether science can eventually provide an explanation of the phenomenon. Many philosophers have argued that science doesn’t have the means to answer the question of what consciousness is (the explanatory gap) but that consciousness nonetheless is fully determined by the physical facts underlying it (no ontological gap). Others have argued that the explanatory gap in the sciences entails an ontological gap. This position is also known as ‘property dualism’. Here I examine a fourth position, according to which there an ontological gap but no explanatory gap.