Phenomenal and computational in the structures of consciousness

Summary

The article examines the limitations of computational models in explaining phenomenal consciousness, emphasizing that natural language plays a crucial role in connecting subjective experiences with mental states. It argues that the use of linguistic signs and memory influences the mind-body problem and cognitive processes. The findings suggest that computational approaches are only one part of understanding mental states, highlighting the importance of qualitative sensory experiences and communicative practices in shaping subjective reality.

Study at a glance

Abstract

This article focuses on the explanatory limits of the computational approach to the phenomenal consciousness. The principal aim is to analyze the methodological bounds of computational models regarding the content of the subjective phenomenal experience. Special attention is given to the correlation between the information theory and the semantic problems of natural language. We proceed from the assumption that the experience of usage of the linguistic sign, together with semiotic and narrative particularities of memory, is the real reason for the causal incompatibility in the mind-body problem. Cognitive processes are initiated to research the consistency between the results of “pure” experience and conceptual schemes. In this case, the computational models represent only one component of the organization of mental states and their descriptions. The reasonings mentioned in this article are based on the argument that it is solely natural language that is a connecting link between corporal organization of the subjective experience and narrative “additional reality” of the phenomenal states. The realization of the conceptual system, necessary for the formation of the subjective reality, arises from the permanent collation of the qualitative property of sensory experience (fixed in memory) with the content of communicative practices.

Tags