[Neurophenomenology: Project for a Science of Past Experiences].
Revista colombiana de psiquiatria September 1, 2012 Peer reviewed DOI: 10.1016/s0034-7450(14)60035-4 via PubMed
Summary
Cognitive science has evolved since the mid-20th century into a multidisciplinary field that explores human cognition through various lenses, including the enactive paradigm and neurophenomenology. The abstract critiques the reductionist approaches to consciousness that overly simplify cognitive phenomena, advocating for a more integrated understanding that considers embodied experiences. It emphasizes the need to reject assumptions that limit cognitive studies to abstract mechanisms.
Study at a glance
| Key finding | The critique highlights the need to move beyond reductionist views of consciousness in cognitive science. |
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Abstract
Since the middle of 20(th) Century, cognitive science has been recognized as the genuine convergence field for all scientific advances in human mind studies with the mechanisms enabling knowledge. Since then, it has become a multidisciplinary area where several research disciplines and actors have acquired citizenship, allowing new expectations on the scientific study of human uniqueness. Critical assessment of the discussion that the discourse of theoretical biology has been assuming regarding the study of the cognitive phenomenon with special attention to the enactive project and, extensively, to the neuro-phenomenology of Francisco J. Varela. Starting with a brief and synthesized history of cognitive science, we will establish the key principles for understanding the emergence of the enactive paradigm and the "embodied" turn influenced by continental phenomenology in the cognitive science, as well as the general guidelines of Neurophenomenology. The "hard problem" of consciousness still faces several types of reductionism relegating the cognitive issue to a kind of merely rational, individual, abstract and disembodied mechanism, thus strengthening the functionalist paradigm in mind philosophy. A solution to classic dichotomies in mind sciences must start rejecting such assumptions.